In this essay, one major school of apologetics -- Presuppositionalism -- is taken up by assessing its logical structure in the writings of its most well-known representative, Cornelius Van Til. The author's conclusion with regard to Van Til's presuppositionalism is that the Christian's apologetic task has been greatly frustrated, in effect, by the replacement of that task with an obscure philosophy about reason-giving.
After identifying the virtual canonical status which the presuppositionalists accord their own position vis-a-vis the evidentialists' position, the author goes on to test out the Van Tilian apologetic on its own terms. (1) Van Til insists that Christian theism be shown, in some sense, to be necessarily true, but lacks any argument which accomplishes this; (2) Van Til's own elucidation of the sort of necessity he is after makes the opposite point -- probability remains; (3) the principles which Van Til advocates to get the argument under way logically preclude the only result Van Til will accept; and (4) Van Til's resort to "analogical reasoning" in order to transcend what would otherwise be a hypothetical conclusion only serves to further obfuscate the presuppositionalist's position. Analogicity cannot be, nor is it intended to be, a logical property of the argument structure employed by the presuppositionalist. Its function seems to the author to be metaphysical in character. But if so, the presuppositionalist's argumentation is "saved" from the level of hypothesis only upon pain of conflating, and hence confusing, the categories of logic and metaphysics.
After identifying the virtual canonical status which the presuppositionalists accord their own position vis-a-vis the evidentialists' position, the author goes on to test out the Van Tilian apologetic on its own terms. (1) Van Til insists that Christian theism be shown, in some sense, to be necessarily true, but lacks any argument which accomplishes this; (2) Van Til's own elucidation of the sort of necessity he is after makes the opposite point -- probability remains; (3) the principles which Van Til advocates to get the argument under way logically preclude the only result Van Til will accept; and (4) Van Til's resort to "analogical reasoning" in order to transcend what would otherwise be a hypothetical conclusion only serves to further obfuscate the presuppositionalist's position. Analogicity cannot be, nor is it intended to be, a logical property of the argument structure employed by the presuppositionalist. Its function seems to the author to be metaphysical in character. But if so, the presuppositionalist's argumentation is "saved" from the level of hypothesis only upon pain of conflating, and hence confusing, the categories of logic and metaphysics.
