CHAPTER I.
OF TWO PRINCIPAL PROCESSES BY WHICH SCIENCE IS CONSTRUCTED.
To the subject of the present Book all that has pre ceded is subordinate and preparatory. The First Part of this work treated of Ideas: we now enter upon the Second Part, in which we have to consider the Know ledge which arises from them. It has already been stated that Knowledge requires us to possess both Facts and Ideas;—that every step in our knowledge consists in applying the ideas and conceptions furnished by our minds to the facts which observation and experiment offer to us. When our conceptions are clear and dis tinct, when our facts are certain and sufficiently numer ous, and when the conceptions, being suited to the nature of the facts, are applied to them so as to produce an exact and universal accordance, we attain knowledge of a precise and comprehensive kind, which we may term Science. And we apply this term to our know ledge still more decidedly when, facts beingthus included in exact and general propositions, such propositions are, in the same manner, included with equal rigour in pro positions of a higher degree of generality; and these again in others of a still wider nature, so as to form a large and systematic whole.
But after thus stating, in a general way, the nature of science, and the elements of which it consists, we have been examining with a more close and extensive scru tiny, some of those elements; and we must now return to our main subject, and apply to it the results of our long investigation. We have been exploring the realm of Ideas; we have been passing in review the difficulties in which the workings of our own minds involve us when we would make our conceptions consistent with themselves: and we have endeavoured to get a sight of the true solutions of these difficulties. We have now to inquire how the results of these long and laborious efforts of thought find their due place in the formation of our knowledge. What do we gain by these attempts to make our notions distinct and consistent; and in what manner is the gain of which we thus become possessed, carried to the general treasure-house of our permanent and indestructible knowledge? After all this battling in the world of ideas, all this struggling with the sha dowy and changing forms of intellectual perplexity, how do we secure to ourselves the fruits of our warfare, and assure ourselves that we have really pushed forwards the frontier of the empire of Science ? It is by such an appropriation that the task which we have had in our hands during the last nine Books of this work, must acquire its real value and true place in our design.
In order to do this, we must reconsider, in a more definite and precise shape, the doctrine which has already been laid down;—that our knowledge consists in apply ing Ideas to Facts; and that the conditions of real knowledge are that the ideas be distinct and appropriate, and exactly applied to clear and certain facts. The steps by which our knowledge is advanced are those by which one or-the other of these two processes is* ren dered more complete ;—by which conceptions are made
more clear in themselves, or by which the conceptions more strictly bind together the facts. These two pro cesses may be considered as together constituting the whole formation of our knowledge; and the principles which have been established in the preceding Books, bear principally upon the former of these two operations; —upon the business of elevating our conceptions to the highest possible point of precision and generality. But these two portions of the progress of knowledge are so clearly connected with each other, that we shall consider them in immediate succession. And having now to conr sider these operations in a more exact and formal manner than it was before possible to do, we shall desig nate them by certain constant and technical phrases. We shall speak of the two processes by which we arrive at science, as the Explication of Conceptions a
OF TWO PRINCIPAL PROCESSES BY WHICH SCIENCE IS CONSTRUCTED.
To the subject of the present Book all that has pre ceded is subordinate and preparatory. The First Part of this work treated of Ideas: we now enter upon the Second Part, in which we have to consider the Know ledge which arises from them. It has already been stated that Knowledge requires us to possess both Facts and Ideas;—that every step in our knowledge consists in applying the ideas and conceptions furnished by our minds to the facts which observation and experiment offer to us. When our conceptions are clear and dis tinct, when our facts are certain and sufficiently numer ous, and when the conceptions, being suited to the nature of the facts, are applied to them so as to produce an exact and universal accordance, we attain knowledge of a precise and comprehensive kind, which we may term Science. And we apply this term to our know ledge still more decidedly when, facts beingthus included in exact and general propositions, such propositions are, in the same manner, included with equal rigour in pro positions of a higher degree of generality; and these again in others of a still wider nature, so as to form a large and systematic whole.
But after thus stating, in a general way, the nature of science, and the elements of which it consists, we have been examining with a more close and extensive scru tiny, some of those elements; and we must now return to our main subject, and apply to it the results of our long investigation. We have been exploring the realm of Ideas; we have been passing in review the difficulties in which the workings of our own minds involve us when we would make our conceptions consistent with themselves: and we have endeavoured to get a sight of the true solutions of these difficulties. We have now to inquire how the results of these long and laborious efforts of thought find their due place in the formation of our knowledge. What do we gain by these attempts to make our notions distinct and consistent; and in what manner is the gain of which we thus become possessed, carried to the general treasure-house of our permanent and indestructible knowledge? After all this battling in the world of ideas, all this struggling with the sha dowy and changing forms of intellectual perplexity, how do we secure to ourselves the fruits of our warfare, and assure ourselves that we have really pushed forwards the frontier of the empire of Science ? It is by such an appropriation that the task which we have had in our hands during the last nine Books of this work, must acquire its real value and true place in our design.
In order to do this, we must reconsider, in a more definite and precise shape, the doctrine which has already been laid down;—that our knowledge consists in apply ing Ideas to Facts; and that the conditions of real knowledge are that the ideas be distinct and appropriate, and exactly applied to clear and certain facts. The steps by which our knowledge is advanced are those by which one or-the other of these two processes is* ren dered more complete ;—by which conceptions are made
more clear in themselves, or by which the conceptions more strictly bind together the facts. These two pro cesses may be considered as together constituting the whole formation of our knowledge; and the principles which have been established in the preceding Books, bear principally upon the former of these two operations; —upon the business of elevating our conceptions to the highest possible point of precision and generality. But these two portions of the progress of knowledge are so clearly connected with each other, that we shall consider them in immediate succession. And having now to conr sider these operations in a more exact and formal manner than it was before possible to do, we shall desig nate them by certain constant and technical phrases. We shall speak of the two processes by which we arrive at science, as the Explication of Conceptions a
