THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 177 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the Pickering/Connick test. The selection of decisions spans from 2004 to the date of publication.
A government employer may not demote or discharge a public employee in retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). While a citizen who enters public service "must accept certain limitations on [her] freedom[s]," Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006), she does not "relinquish the First Amendment rights [she] would otherwise enjoy as [a citizen] to comment on matters of public interest," Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968). Thus, the aim is to strike "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35. Alves v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, (11th Cir. 2015).
The Connick-Pickering test, derived from Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), and Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, is a two-part test used to determine whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected. See Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 790-91 (7th Cir.2006). "First, the speech is protected only if it addressed a matter of public concern." Carreon v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir.2005). "If it did, the court must then apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether 'the interests of the [plaintiff] as a citizen in commenting upon the matters of public concern' are outweighed by 'the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'" Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir.1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731). Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F. 3d 784 (7th Cir. 2015).
A government employer may not demote or discharge a public employee in retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). While a citizen who enters public service "must accept certain limitations on [her] freedom[s]," Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006), she does not "relinquish the First Amendment rights [she] would otherwise enjoy as [a citizen] to comment on matters of public interest," Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968). Thus, the aim is to strike "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35. Alves v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, (11th Cir. 2015).
The Connick-Pickering test, derived from Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), and Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, is a two-part test used to determine whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected. See Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 790-91 (7th Cir.2006). "First, the speech is protected only if it addressed a matter of public concern." Carreon v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir.2005). "If it did, the court must then apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether 'the interests of the [plaintiff] as a citizen in commenting upon the matters of public concern' are outweighed by 'the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'" Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir.1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731). Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F. 3d 784 (7th Cir. 2015).
