Using the theme “The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007,” the 2007 Conference of Army Historians featured over sixty formal papers exploringthenatureofunconventionalwarfareanditssignificancethroughout history.TheeventalsoincludedseveralworkshopsandsessionsonadministrativeissuesofcommonconcernacrosstheArmyhistoricalcommunityandmuch informaldiscussionandnetworking.Fromtheopeningoftheconferencetothe final dinner, where U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A. Cody addressed the current operating environment and answered hard questions from the audience about the future, the conference informed participants about differing aspects of the type of warfare confronting the U.S. Army in the Global War on Terrorism today.
The fifteen papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole.
Each paper provides useful insights to the reader, soldiers and historians
alike.
The fifteen papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole.
Each paper provides useful insights to the reader, soldiers and historians
alike.
